II. A flavour of Europe : understanding the foundations of the EU

1. From national identity to European diversity

Major trends include : the search for prosperity, the sense of social welfare, an increasing acceptance of  wealth sharing, the rejection of violence to solve the conflicts, a sense of compassion towards humanitarian disasters and the rejection of abuse against human rights all around the world.

It does not go without profound contradictions which do not help action.

A common European way of life has taken place which has chosen diversity a s foundation and a goal.

Political pluralism, sexual diversity, Multiculturalism as a value, respect for the individual, human rights, an exacerbated respect for human life. Not it surprinsingly, it goes with major contradictions. Drug tolerance versus agressive campaign against tobacco, abortion at a high rate along with  avoidance for death penalty. A tolerance for risks on the roads which fringes absurdity.

Indeed, "We", Europeans form a complex and fragile community. More or less, the cultural trends in Europe ressemble very much New York City, even if NYC is not America. My personal sense is that in the span of two generations, may be less, most of the American people will come close to this situation.

Here comes the problem of the fundamental relation between war and politics.

2. A European farewell to Clausewitz

Europeans dislike to hear about war. War films, war books are commercial failures on the European market with a notable exception "Save the private Ryan". So far, Europeans are not very good at dealing with the ghosts of the past. Dirty secrets remain unveiled. Contrition for war crimes has taken a long time. In France, bitter controversies about the war in Algeria persist.[4]

There is a strong reluctance in Europe for war. For most Europeans, the end of the Cold War equated with the end of war. They have contemplated with horror and indignation the ethnic war in the Balkans and approved an armed force humanitarian intervention. The notion of security for continental Europe has a precise meaning for the present century : war should no longer be considered a tool for achieving political goals.

As far as the rest of the world is concerned the relevance of war is much more controversial.  Most Europeans question the level of the American defense budget. They dont see its rationale. This persistant interrogation is a source of political unrest with Washington. Most Europeans -who have little sympathy for dictators- do not understand the real goals of the war against Iraq. So far, they think that the Iranian nuclear crisis can be solved by diplomacy and a blend of pressures.

Do such reservations imply that Europeans have become "impotent and obsolete"[5] in today's world ?

Beware Manicheism !  Robert Kagan, after Sam Huntington is successfull because it simplifies the situation. The clash of civilisation was -and still is- dangerous because its helps creating wrong perceptions. The split between paradise and power is equally misleading. It presents to the Europeans an America oversimplified and to Americans a Europe which meets their fear, not their hopes.[6]

The Balkan lessons are important to help define the nature of overseas operations.

Let me say that perhaps the biggest change is in the nature of war. Fifty years ago, war meant the destruction of enemy forces and the disruption the enemy country. The more it suffered, including the civilians, the best it was. Today western war must be waged with the objective to rebuild and bring assistance to the people. It is not only a major change but also a great challenge. 

The rethoric about old and new Europe proceeds from the same and agravated neglect of the real world . The Poles are joining NATO and send forces into Afghanistan and Iraq. Have they become suddenly offensive and war oriented ? On the contrary. They buy security assurance in Europe.

To conclude, I borrow a formula  from a former French Chief of staff of the Armies, admiral Lanxade who declared : "while Americans see war as a solution to international crisis, the Europeans favor crisis management." They admit that preventive diplomacy needs to be supported by armed forces but their use should come as a last resort. Therefore the military campaign should be limited in violence and in duration.

3. American dilemmas and PESD : how much and what for ?

During the Cold War the US have always asked for a greater European commitment in the burdensharing and risksharing.

But confronted with a major soviet threat both nuclear and conventionnal, America had vital interests at stake and took over the major responsability and the largest part of the burden. Today the Unites States do not see Europe as an area of danger..Russia is weak in respect to the US. It does not means necessarily that it does not remain a high priority concern for its small European neighbours.

Now, if Europeans are serious about spending efficiently about acquiring capabilities, they will approach, step by step, a level of military capacity and usability which will give them some degree of autonomy. And the United States have to accept the full consequences of what they ask for. In this respect, and even if, personnaly, I am not a Tervuren fan, the creation of a planning cell and specific headquarters with command, control and intelligence capabilities are nothing more than the consequence of a greater European commitment for defense. As Kissinger put it when he was writing about Transatlantic misunderstandings : you cannot equally win from two different worlds. The question : how much is enough is related to another one how much is too much ?

In addition, because of the end of the Cold War, the perceptions of the threat have changed on both sides of the Atlantic.. Ballistic missiles, WMD and terrorism are much less convincing than a single speech by Stalin or Brejnev, years ago.

In democratic countries the capability approach is not the easiest one. The public and the politicians agree to spend on defense when they see the enemy, when they feel the pain because of terrorist actions. Nine Eleven has created a new sense of danger and a new need for protection which, in my view is wrongly handled by the present administration. The confusion between Al Qaida terrorist activities and Saddam Hussein, using WMD as a linkage is a strategic mistake.

They real world shows that the cooperation between competent agencies has been remakably succesfull. And hopefully it will continue.